Rank-order relational data, in which each actor ranks the others according to some criterion, often arise from sociometric measurements of judgment (e.g., self-reported interpersonal interaction) or preference (e.g., relative liking). We propose a class of exponential-family models for rank-order relational data and derive a new class of sufficient statistics for such data, which assume no more than within-subject ordinal properties. Application of MCMC MLE to this family allows us to estimate effects for a variety of plausible mechanisms governing rank structure in cross-sectional context, and to model the evolution of such structures over time. We apply this framework to model the evolution of relative liking judgments in an acquaintance process, and to model recall of relative volume of interpersonal interaction among members of a technology education program.
Introduction
Rank-order sociometric data have a long history in the social sciences (Newcomb, 1961; Sampson, 1968; Bernard and Killworth, 1977) . While many network processes (e.g., diffusion, brokerage, exchange) are only sensibly posited for networks with categorical or ratio scale relationship states, many others-particularly those involving personal preferences (e.g., liking, adviceseeking)-are much more readily represented ordinally, and, indeed, may not even have interval, ratio, or categorical meaning. It is also common practice in statistics to reduce data with unknown or problematic distributional form to ranks for nonparametric analyses such as Kruskal-Wallis and MannWhitney procedures, and similar use may be made of ranks in networks with valued ties as a compromise between analyzing tie values as they are and dichotomizing them (Newcomb, 1961, pp. 32-34, for example) .
The most common approach taken to analyzing rank-valued network data in current practice is to dichotomize ranks into binary ties, defining a tie to be present if a given ego had ranked a given alter above a certain cut-off and absent otherwise. Cut-offs have been set at a particular rank (e.g., top 5) (Breiger, Boorman, and Arabie, 1975; White, Boorman, and Breiger, 1976; Arabie, Boorman, and Levitt, 1978; Wasserman, 1980; Pattison, 1982; Harris, Florey, Tabor, Bearman, Jones, and Udry, 2003, for example) ; at a particular quantile (e.g., top 50%) (Krackhardt and Handcock, 2007) ; or have been found adaptively (Doreian, Kapuscinski, Krackhardt, and Szczypula, 1996) . Another common approach is to focus on rank correlations and on treating ranks on an additive scale (Newcomb, 1956; Nakao and Romney, 1993) .
These approaches come with significant limitations. Dichotomizing ties requires a threshold point to be selected, inevitably discarding information and possibly introducing biases (Thomas and Blitzstein, 2011) , while methods like rank correlation are limited to simple comparisons and cannot, for example, be used to examine the strength of one social factor after controlling for the effects of another.
Modeling frameworks explicitly designed for rank-order data would address these limitations, but to the authors' best knowledge, model-based approaches to rank network data as such have been very limited. Murphy (2007, 2008) , for instance, use a generalization of the PlackettLuce model (Plackett, 1975) in a latent position framework to model what can be viewed as a bipartite rank-order network of affiliations from voters to candidates in Irish proportional representation through the single transferable vote elections. Null models for comparison of rank-order (or otherwise valued) data structures were developed by Hubert (1987) , and model-based extensions of this approach for comparison of multiple structures have been introduced by Butts (2007b) . (See also related work on null hypothesis test-ing in a network regression context, e.g., that of Krackhardt (1987) and Dekker, Krackhardt, and Snijders (2007) .) This latter work is focused on modeling degrees of correspondence between relational structures, and does not attempt to model the internal properties of rank-valued networks themselves. This second problem is the focus of the present paper.
For modeling of internal network structure, exponential-family random graph (ERG) or p * models (Holland and Leinhardt, 1981; Wasserman and Pattison, 1996; Robins, Pattison, and Wasserman, 1999) are the currently favored approach. Models parameterized in this way have been applied to social network data in a variety of contexts, including dichotomized rankorder data (Krackhardt and Handcock, 2007; Goodreau, Kitts, and Morris, 2008b) . Recently, Krivitsky (2012) formulated a generalized framework for exponential-family models on networks whose ties have values. In this work, we develop ERG models for ordinal relational data, focusing on the case of forced complete orderings, but with an eye toward more general ordinal data. In Section 2, we discuss representation of ordinal relational data and introduce the probabilistic framework for exponential-family models for them, and in Section 3, we describe statistics that could be used to model common network properties within this framework. We discuss issues involved in implementation and statistical inference on these models in Section 4. Two applications of this framework are demonstrated in Section 5.
Exponential-Family Framework for Ordinal Relational Data
We begin this section by defining notation for representation of ordinal relational data and by establishing basic principles for using such data in a manner that respects its intrinsic measurement properties. Throughout this article, we will use "A p = " to refer to what could be called a "distinct Cartesian power" of a set A: the set of distinct p-tuples of its elements. Formally,
where A p is the pth Cartesian power of A. A rank-valued network consists of a set of actors, N of cardinality n = |N |, together with a dyadic adjacency structure y whose i, j pairs reflect the rank of (alter) j with respect to (ego) i. Formally, y is a mapping from the set of dyads (distinct ordered pairs of actors) Y ≡ N 2 = , to a set S for which there exists some binary operator, > expressing the ordinal sense of S. In general, we make few assumptions regarding >, using here only the constraint that for all (i, j, k) ∈ N 3 = , either y i,j > y i,k or y i,j ≯ y i,k . Importantly, y i,j are not assumed to be comparable across egos: for each ego, we may only say that one alter is ">" another (or that this does not hold). The relation ">" could represent "preferred to", "interacted more with than", "judged to be taller than", or any other judgment of interest.
With the additional assumption of transitivity, the above formulation leads to (y, >) representing a partial ordering of alters by each ego. Finally, a further constraint on > that ¬(y i,j > y i,k ) =⇒ y i,k > y i,j results in a complete ordering, which may arise when an ego is forced to rank all of the alters with no ties permitted. This is an important special case, and we consider it here in more detail. Krivitsky (2012) suggests that a sample space of complete rankings of every actor in a network by every other actor can be represented by a directed network with no self-loops (Y = N 2 = ) and space of dyad values S = {1 .. n − 1}, with the ranked nature of the data leading to a complex constraint structure for Y:
That is, each ego i assigns a unique ranking to each alter j. For convenience, the lowest rank is coded as 1 and the highest as n − 1. This formulation is slightly misleading in that elements of S have only ordinal and not interval or ratio meanings, and, as we noted above, are only ordered within the rankings of a given ego. That is, it makes sense to ask if for some y ∈ Y and (i, j, k) ∈ N 3 = , y i,j > y i,k -whether i had ranked j over k, but not to evaluate the difference between ranks (y i,j − y i,k ) or to compare ranks by different egos (y j,i > y k,i ). It does, however, represent distinct complete rankings in a concise and convenient manner, so we make use of it, with the proviso that the statistics evaluated on y ∈ Y make use of no operation other than comparison within an ego's rankings. To concisely represent this fundamental operation, we define an indicator
Taking the set defined by (1) as our sample space, we can formulate an exponential family for (complete) rank-order networks by defining sufficient statistics g : Y → R p and parametrizing it by θ ∈ Θ (Θ ⊆ R q ) which are mapped to canonical parameters via mapping η : Θ → R p :
with the normalizing factor
The sufficient statistics g may also implicitly incorporate exogenous covariates x. For the purposes of this paper, we assume these to be fixed and known, and we further limit our development to linear exponential families, in which η(θ) ≡ θ.
Terms and Parameters for Ordinal Relational Data
We now introduce and discuss a variety of sufficient statistics g(·) for the model of (3) ("model terms") that abide by the restrictions discussed in Section 2 while viably representing phenomena frequently observed in social networks. For each term, we discuss how it may be interpreted, without assuming rankings to have more than ordinal meaning.
"Promotion" statistics and interpretation
For binary ERGMs, Snijders, Pattison, Robins, and Handcock (2006) , Hunter, Handcock, Butts, Goodreau, and Morris (2008b) , and others have used change statistics, the effect on the model of a toggling of a tie-an atomic change in the binary network structure-to aid in interpreting the model terms. For complete ordering data, where changing the ranking of one individual necessarily changes ranking of others, a candidate for an analogous atomic change must affect positions of as few actors as possible. Such a change is the swapping of rankings by two adjacently-ranked alters by a single ego. We thus use the effect of having ego i "promote" a promotable alter j ∈ {k ∈ N : k = i ∧ y i,k < n − 1}, swapping j's rank with that of the alter previously ranked immediately above j, as such a change.
Let y i,(r) be the alter j such that y i,j = r, and let y i: j k be network y where i had swapped rankings of j and k. We define a promotion statistic as
For the sake of readability, we will use "j + " as shorthand for y i,(y i,j +1) -the alter of i immediately above j.
This quantity emerges when considering the effect of the promotion on the odds of observing a modified network (relative to some reference structure) under the model:
That is, holding the rest of the network fixed, ego i is exp(η(θ) · ∆ i,j g(y)) times more likely to rank j one rank higher than j is ranked by i in y than not, according to the model. Note that promotion statistics are mainly useful for complete orderings: if the ordering is partial, it is possible for i to promote j without demoting j + .
Exogenous factors
We begin our quorum of substantively useful statistics by considering "exogenous" factors: those factors that would influence rankings by an ego i in a manner that is independent (in the probabilistic sense) of the rankings of all other egos i ∈ N \ {i}. Substantively, these factors are exogenous to the ranking process in that they are not, at least on the time scale of the process, mutable, or in that they operate independently of an ego i being able to observe or infer rankings or other salient states or actions (that are endogenous to the model) of any other ego i .
Attractiveness/Popularity Effects
For assessments of attractiveness, liking, and status, it is likely that egos' rankings will be influenced by some relatively stable (and exogenous) tendencies of particular alters to rate more highly than others. For instance, assessments of physical attractiveness tend to be broadly consistent within a given cultural context, and such assessments correlate positively with physical attributes and performance characteristics (e.g., subtleties of dress and speech) that are usually difficult to alter over short time scales (Morse, Reis, Gruzen, and Wolff, 1974; Webster and Driskell, 1983) . Thus, we have the emic notion that some persons "are attractive", with the attribution regarded as an fixed trait of the person being assessed; while the reality is less trivial, stable factors governing attractiveness are sufficiently important that we may wish to capture them where possible. In other settings, institutionalized status characteristics (e.g., group membership, formal social roles) or the like may have similar effects (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch, 1972; Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch, 1977) .
Regardless of source, we can treat these effects directly by positing some covariate x ∈ R n , associated with a statistic of the general form
This statistic simply indexes the tendency for those with higher values on x to rank more highly than those with lower values. The promotion statistic associated with the above is of the form
i.e., twice the difference between the attractiveness of j and the actor over whom j may be promoted. Thus, the effect of this term on the odds of i promoting j is exp(2η Attract. (θ)(x j − x j + )). As expressed, g Attract. treats x as at least an interval scale; in other cases, the subtraction operator would need to be replaced with a more appropriate function. While x may be an observed covariate, it is worth noting that this quantity is also a natural candidate for treatment via a random popularity effect (van Duijn, Snijders, and Zijlstra, 2004) .
Difference/Similarity Effects
Just as one may posit differential tendency to "win" ranking contests overall, one may also posit that each actor i has exogenous characteristic x i ∈ X such that alters "close to" or "far from" ego will be more likely to be highly ranked than those with the reverse attributes. This is a familiar application of homophily/heterophily to the rank order case, and the implementation is straightforward:
where z : X 2 → R is any function that is monotone increasing in the difference between its arguments. Thus, where this statistic is enhanced we expect "far" actors to outrank "near" ones (from the point of actor i), with the reverse holding where this statistic is suppressed. The atomic effect of this term is simply
As with attractiveness, difference effects can be based either on observed covariates or on latent quantities.
Dyadic covariates
We can extend the above logic to general dyadic covariates. For instance, we may consider a case in which a within-context ranking is made by actors having ongoing social relationships; we might expect, then, that actors engaged in positive long-term relationships would tend to give preference to their partners within the specific rating context. Statistics for this behavior can be produced like so:
Of course, the cases of attractiveness and difference described above are simply special cases of dyadic covariates, with particular structure imposed.
(Notably, the matrix permutation family (ERGP) of Butts (2007a) has a somewhat similar structure.)
Comparison covariates
Finally, in the framework of pairwise comparison, the most general exogenous covariate form assigns a weight to each pairwise comparison by each ego:
for some x ∈ R N 3 = , with
This statistic has all other exogenous statistics as special cases.
Endogenous factors
We now turn to factors that are endogenous, in the sense that, unlike exogenous factors, their effect on the rankings by ego i does depend on rankings by other egos i ∈ N \ {i}. Substantively, these are factors for phenomena that may plausibly arise in cases for which ego observes or is able to infer the rankings of others.
Global conformity
In many settings where an ego is able to observe or infer the rankings of others, there is reason to presume that this will influence ego, so that he or she will tend to bring his or her own rankings into conformance with others'. This is certainly true in dominance or status rankings, where there is considerable evidence that individuals can and do infer status ordering from observation of third-party judgments (see, e.g., Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, and Chatman, 2006) ; this synchronization may even be explicit, as in certain types of gossip (wherein two or more parties "compare notes" on the relative status of their peers). The status of influence for relations such as relative liking is less clear, but still plausible: ego may take alter's evaluations of the relative merits of other alters into account in assessing his or her own preferences, just one can be influenced in one's judgment of the merits of food, art, or other experiential goods by the evaluations of others. Finally, the mutual observability of rankings may produce in some settings a form of "conformity pressure" (Asch, 1951, for example), such that those displaying deviant rankings anticipate (and are possibly exposed to) sanction. The importance of influence processes in such settings is well-documented. To formalize influence in the ranking context, we must note that four elements are involved: ego's assessment of two alters (say, j and k), and the assessment of those same alters by a distinct third party (say, l / ∈ {i, j, k}). Denoting ego by i, we note that ego's assessment of j and k is in conformity with l's assessment of j and k when y i: j>k = y l: j>k and y i: k>j = y l: k>j . A natural statistic to summarize the degree of ratings nonconformity, then, is
The promotion statistic for nonconformity can be derived by observing that when i promotes j over j + , the statistic is incremented by 2 for every other ego l who has j + ranked over j and decremented by 2 for every l who has j ranked over j + . Thus,
a "vote" among the ls as to the relative ranking of j and j + . Insofar as influence is active, g GNC should be suppressed (and the associated parameter negative). In the typical case of total ordering within subjects, sufficiently strong suppression of g GNC will force the population to converge to a universal consensus ranking; if the suppression is weaker, a looser but analogous set of states will be favored.
It should be noted that this form of influence and the random attractiveness effect, mentioned in Section 3.2.1, can both explain the same network feature: both heterogeneity in attractiveness and social influence induce an agreement in rankings, and the latter may be considered a marginal representation of the former, in a manner similar to that of a within-group correlation as a marginal reflection of a (conditional) random effects linear model.
Local conformity
For global nonconformity g GNC , the promotion statistic (7) implies that i weights agreement with every other l equally, regardless of how i had ranked l. In some cases, it may be plausible that the salience of l for i may depend upon i's ranking of him or her; for instance, i may be more likely to attend to (and to conform to) those whom he or she ranks highly than those whom he or she ranks lower. A possible formalization of this is the notion that i's ranking of j would be influenced by l only if i ranks l over j, so only actors ranked above j influence i's ranking of j. As with global conformity, we define this statistic, the local nonconformity, negatively: counting the number of instances where an ego had ranked l over j but then did not conform to l's ranking of j relative to some fourth alter k:
The atomic effects for this statistic are somewhat complex:
They have, however, a meaningful interpretation. The two terms (9a) represent the effect of i bringing his or her ordering of j and j + into conformance (or disconformance) with those of some actor k whom i had ranked higher than at least one of them. The pair (9b) represents the situation where some actor k ranks i over j and/or j + , so i promoting j over j + either creates or eliminates nonconformity on the part of k. The pair (9c) represent the notion that nonconformity is also created if actors i and j disagree on the ordering of j + and some actor k, so i promoting j over j + creates nonconformity by making j's ordering of j + salient to i. (Ego i can resolve this tension either by changing the ranking of j + and k to conform with j (affecting (9a)) or by demoting j to make his or her ranking less salient.)
Deference aversion
Influence, as defined above, deals with the mutual adjustment among raters regarding their relative assessments of third parties. When ego is a party to the rating in question, the situation becomes more complex. By assumption, ego does not explicitly self-rate; thus, ego cannot adjust towards alter's impression of him or her. In many settings, however, another mechanism may be active that will make alter's ranking of ego salient for ego's ranking of alter. In particular, consider the case in which higher rankings are associated with positive evaluation, such that being ranked below others is aversive. Moreover, let us assume that ego infers his or her own status via an implicit transitivity mechanism, such that if alter l ranks j above ego (i) and ego ranks l above j, then ego is for social purposes ranking him-or herself below l. Under such circumstances, deference aversion may lead ego to resist ranking l above j.
To capture this notion with a statistic, we propose the following:
We expect this statistic to be suppressed where deference aversion is present. The promotion statistic is incremented if j + had ranked i over j, since it creates a deference of j + to i via j; or if j had ranked j + over i since it creates a deference of i to j via k; and it is decremented if j + had ranked j over i, as it would eliminate the deference of i to j + via j; or if j had ranked i over j + , as it would eliminate the deference of j to i via j + . Thus,
It is interesting to note that the principal effect of suppressing this statistic is actually to bring ego's rankings in line with those of alter, somewhat akin to the reciprocity or mutuality in binary relations. Specifically, if there are r persons ranked by alter as being above ego, then ego will also tend to rank those same r persons as being above alter. Where a total order is present, ego and alter will thus tend to give each other the same rank (and, indeed, to agree on those persons having higher ranks). Of course, applying this logic to all pairs suggests pressure towards equality, which is impossible to achieve in the total order case (but not necessarily for others). Even in the case of total orders, however, considerable variation in g Defer. is possible, with lower values indicating rating structures in which agreement between raters on high-ranked alters is maximized.
Consistency across settings
When ranking the same alters among multiple settings-across time or across rubrics-there is reason to expect that ego will tend to exhibit consistency in alter ratings. Across time, this is an exogenous effect, because earlier rankings cannot be influenced by later rankings. Across rubrics, it may be endogenous. Here, we assume two rating structures, y and y , on vertex sets N and N , such that some set N s = N ∩ N of actors are involved in both networks. For convenience in notation, we take the labeling of the members of N s to be the same in both N and N . Given this, our statistic measuring inconsistency is simply As g Incon. measures the discordant pairs of rankings in y versus y , suppressing it implies higher levels of cross-context consistency. The statistic (11) treats all disagreements between y and y as equivalent. It may be the case, however, that only some disagreements are of interest, or disagreements themselves need to be modeled. This can be facilitated by a more general form of g Incon. . Given weights x ∈ R N 3 = , symmetric such that (12) x can, itself, be parametrized to model factors affecting disagreement between two rankings.
Inference and implementation
The proposed class of models is a finite exponential family over a finite sample space. Thus, at least in the non-curved case with η(θ) ≡ θ, its natural parameter space Θ N = {θ : κ η,g (θ ) < ∞} = R
q , an open set, so the models from this family are regular and posses all of the inferential properties of such families. (Brown, 1986, pp. 1-2) We briefly discuss practical issues associated with fitting the models of this class.
Implementation
The sample space of a complete ranking ERGM is finite but large (|Y| = ((n − 1)!) n ), so even for networks of modest size, evaluating the normalizing constant (4) is not computationally feasible. However, provided a method for sampling from this ERGM distribution Pr θ;η,g (·) exists, the MCMC MLE method can be used to fit the model. (Geyer and Thompson, 1992; Hunter and Handcock, 2006; Krivitsky, 2012) We describe a simple algorithm for sampling from an ERGM for complete ordering defined in Section 2 in the Appendix. We base our implementation on the extensions of Krivitsky (2012) to the R package ergm for fitting binary ERGMs. (Handcock, Hunter, Butts, Goodreau, Krivitsky, and Morris, 2012) , using the valued representation described in Section 2 and Algorithm 1 to draw samples for the MCMC MLE. We expect to incorporate this implementation into a future public release.
Lacking a general procedure such as the maximum pseudo-likelihood estimation (MPLE) (Strauss and Ikeda, 1990 ) to use as a starting point for optimization, we initiated the MCMC MLE optimization at θ = 0 in each of our applications. This parameter configuration corresponds to a uniform distribution on the space of possible rankings.
Degeneracy
Degeneracy, in its many meanings, is often a concern in applying ERGMs. Despite recent progress (Rinaldo, Fienberg, and Zhou, 2009; Butts, 2010; Schweinberger, 2011 , for example), few general and unambiguous diagnostics for degeneracy exist beyond simulated goodness-of-fit measures and diagnostics of symptoms such as poor convergence of the MLE-finding procedure and, in particular, poor mixing of the MCMC MLE algorithm (Goodreau, Handcock, Hunter, Butts, and Morris, 2008a) , often due to multimodality of the distribution of networks under the model. (Snijders et al., 2006; Rinaldo et al., 2009; Krivitsky, 2012) In our case, there is some cause for concern due to the high order of some of the sufficient statistics we propose. For example, g GNC is a summation of indicators over a set of cardinality N 4 = = O(n 4 ). Its promotion statistic ∆ i,j g GNC is a sum over a set of O(n). Thus, there may exist configurations for which a small change in the ranking leads to a massive change in the value of this statistic and thus in the likelihood. Such statistics can induce excessively strong dependence in many cases lead to asymptotic degeneracy (Butts, 2010; Schweinberger, 2011) . At the same time, a number of factors is likely to ameliorate such problems for the specific case of rank data. A network of ranks simply contains more information than a network of binary outcomes of the same size. More concretely, a uniform distribution over binary directed networks of size n with no self-loops has entropy of n(n − 1) bits, while a uniform distribution over rank networks has entropy of log 2 ((n − 1)!) n = n log 2 (n−1)! bits, which grows much faster in n. This can reduce the risk of pathological model behavior due to poor identification in the small-n case. Also, while there exists the potential for problematic statistics and configurations, the constrained nature of the sample space makes degeneracy more difficult to achieve than is the case for typical graphs or digraphs: an ego cannot promote one alter without demoting another, and while some statistics, like g GNC , have an extreme case of all actors agreeing, others, like g Defer. , cannot be reduced to 0.
In all of the following examples, we found no symptoms of degeneracy: all estimators converged without issues to estimates for which the expectations of sufficient statistics matched their observed values, and MCMC diagnostics showed no sign of poor mixing or multimodality. That these MLEs were found and converged to despite the 0 starting point, again, suggests that models using the terms introduced here are quite robust.
Examples

Dynamics of acquaintance process
From 1953 to 1956, a research group led by Theodore Newcomb (1961) conducted an experimental study of acquaintance and friendship formation. In each of the two study years, 17 men attending the University of Michiganall transfer students with no prior acquaintance among them-were recruited to live in off-campus fraternity-style housing. Demographic, attitudinal, and sociometric information was collected about the subjects. In particular, in the second year, at each of 15 weekly time points (with week 9 being missing), each participant was asked to rate all other participants on "favorableness of feeling", with ratings forced to be distinct and converted to ranks. (1961, pp. 32-34) These data represent an example of longitudinal data of complete ranks, and, particularly the data from the second year of the study, have been used to study the formation of interpersonal relationships by Newcomb (1956) , Breiger et al. (1975) , White et al. (1976) , Arabie et al. (1978) , Wasserman (1980) , Pattison (1982) , Nakao and Romney (1993) , Doreian et al. (1996) , Krackhardt and Handcock (2007) , and many others.
We use ERGMs for ordinal data to study this network, examining the social forces relevant to its structure and its evolution over time. We take two distinct approaches: cross-sectional, where each time point's network structure is modeled on its own and dynamic, where each time point but the first is effectively modeled as a change from the previous time point's rankings.
Cross-sectional analysis
Demographic data, including age, religion, and political views of the subjects were gathered. Also, within the house, the subjects were assigned to rooms, spread over two floors of the house-three one-occupant rooms, four twooccupant, and two three-occupant rooms. (Newcomb, 1961, pp. 67-68) Furthermore, while some were assigned to rooms at random, others were assigned with an aim to maximize (for some rooms) and minimize (for other rooms) the roommates' compatibility as understood by the researchers (1961, pp. 216-220) . All of these factors could be used as predictors in our modeling framework via terms introduced in Section 3.2. However, these measurements do not appear to be publicly available, so we focus on the endogenous effects, although the "birds of a feather or friend of a friend" caveat applies. For each of the 15 networks, we model deference aversion (via g Defer. (Y t ) (10)) and global (via g GNC (Y t ) (6)) and local (via g LNC (Y t ) (8)) conformity. Per Section 3.3.1, the suppressing of the global nonconformity statistic produces the same effect as latent actor attractiveness, so it may, in this case, be viewed as modeling latent heterogeneity in popularity.
We report the maximum likelihood estimates for each of the terms over time in Table 1 and plot them in Figure 1 . Deference aversion is significant (the coefficient on the deference statistic is negative) throughout the evolution of rankings, starting with the first point of observation. This is consistent with the finding of Newcomb (1956) , Doreian et al. (1996) , and others that "friendships are reciprocated immediately". Our analysis, however, suggests deepening deference aversion over time, not reaching its ultimate magnitude until week 4 or 7. (Informally, the estimated Kendall's rank correlation between the parameter estimate and week number isτ = −0.43, significant with P -value = 0.028.) One explanation for this difference is that prior analyses, including that of Doreian et al. (1996) , dichotomized the dyads in the network. Our approach uses the entire ranking and may thus be more Coefficients statistically significant at α = 0.05 are bolded. Standard errors incorporate the uncertainty introduced by approximating of the likelihood using MCMC (Hunter and Handcock, 2006) .
sensitive.
The local nonconformity term is also significant for all but the first observation point, although its effects seem to emerge more gradually than those of deference aversion (Kendall'sτ = −0.58, P -value = 0.002), leveling off around Week 7 or perhaps even later. This does agree with Doreian et al. (1996) , although others have suggested earlier and later times when the network stabilized.
In the presence of the local nonconformity term, the global nonconformity term is not significant: there does not appear to be a significant overall consensus in ratings, although Newcomb (1956) reports that three specific subjects were generally disliked by everyone, including each other, so perhaps failing to detect this is a result of lack of power and presence of the local nonconformity term. Notably, the estimated correlation between the local and global nonconformity parameters (within each week's fit) is strongly negative and consistent (−0.87-−0.79). This suggests that these terms explain similar behavior, though, significance of one and not the other indicates that conformity is primarily to those more liked.
Dynamic analysis
We now turn to modeling the evolution of the rankings over time. For our dynamic analysis, we use a simple Markov formulation similar to those of Krackhardt and Handcock (2007) and Hanneke, Fu, and Xing (2010) for the evolution of rankings over time:
, having the normalizing constant
For each of the 14 transitions between successive networks, in addition to the three terms used in the cross-sectional analysis, we model inconsistency over time via g Incon. (Y t ; Y t−1 ) (11). This term effectively absorbs the structure in the network at t that is due to inertia and to social forces operating in the time periods prior to t − 1, and thus the other terms model the social forces affecting only the changes in the rankings over time. Because we seek to examine the strengths of the factors over time, we use time-varying parameters (although Krivitsky and Handcock (2010) show that the approach of Hunter and Handcock (2006) can be applied to series of networks or transitions as well). Week 9 rankings were not reported. Because of this, for Week 10, we fit the parameters for transition from Week 8.
The maximum likelihood estimates for each transition are reported in Table 2 and visualized in Figure 2 . The estimates for the transition from Week 8 to Week 10 do not appear to be qualitatively different from those from nearby transitions. In particular, inconsistency does not appear to be higher over this particular two-week period.
The clear downward trend (τ = −0.56, P -value = 0.005) in inconsistency over successive weeks suggests that the rankings are initially in flux as the acquaintance process takes place, solidifying over time. As before, global nonconformity is not a significant factor. The parameter estimates for the other two factors still appear to be, on the whole, significant, but are uniformly smaller in magnitude compared to those of the corresponding weeks in the cross-sectional analysis and are less precisely estimated (as represented by uniformly greater standard errors). This is because rather than embodying the structure of the whole network, they embody only the structure of changes in the network over the week, and information to infer their strength is drawn only from those changes. This means that some "instant" social effects such as friendship reciprocation have been absorbed into the Week 0 observation, which is not modeled in the dynamic analysis.
In contrast to the cross-sectional analysis, neither deference nor local nonconformity appear to have a significant monotone trend over time (both correlations have P -value ≥ 0.5). That is, while they are time-varying when viewed cross-sectionally, the effects of these social forces over and above inertia are fairly consistent over time, at least after the initial time point. This suggests that this modeling approach may be successfully isolating social forces as they affect actors' behavior over time from the effects of preexisting configurations.
Informant accuracy
In the late 1970s, Bernard, Killworth, Kronenfeld, and Sailer (1984) conducted a series of studies to assess the accuracy of retrospective sociometric surveys of several types. In each study, respondents in a social networkdeaf teletype users; amateur radio operators; office workers at a firm; students in a fraternity; and faculty, graduate students, and staff in an academic program-had their social interactions observed or recorded and were asked, in retrospect, to indicate others in their network with whom they interacted, allowing recalled and observed network structures to be compared. In the latter study-conducted in a graduate program in technology education at West Virginia University-the 34 subjects had the frequency of their interactions recorded by a team of observers over the course of a week, and then each subject was asked to provide a complete ranking of the other subjects on "most to least communication that week" (Bernard and Killworth, 1977) . This produces a complete ranking, suitable for analysis using our methods.
Modeling inconsistency
In this application, we use models with sufficient statistics of the form (11) and (12) to assess factors that appear to affect accuracy of rankings. Let y ∈ Y be the reported rankings; and let y ct. ∈ N Y 0 be a weighted symmetric graph of the observed frequencies of interaction, so that y ct.
i,j is the number of times i and j were observed interacting. Like y t−1 in the previous example, it is exogenous in our framework.
For notational convenience, we reexpress (3) and (12) as
,
where
for covariate array x ∈ R N 3 = ×{1 .. p} , so that x i,j,k is the p-vector of covariates associated with i's comparison of j and k, and, as before, x i,j,k ≡ x i,k,j . This allows us to model inconsistency in a form semblant of logistic regression. Unlike logistic regression for accuracy of pairwise comparisons, this model takes into account the dependence between the comparisons that is induced by the structure of the sample space. (I.e., that y i: j>k ∧ y i: k>l =⇒ y i: j>l .)
Because there are "ties" among the observed interaction frequencies (∃ (i,j,k)∈N 3 = y ct.
i,j = y ct.
i,k ), while the reported rankings are forced to be complete (no ties were allowed), there is no configuration of rankings y ∈ Y, such that statistic (11) is 0-that the reported rankings are completely consistent with those observed. This reveals an interesting property of the proposed class of models: because the comparisons that are tied in the observed frequencies simply add a constant to their sufficient statistic, their effect on the likelihood is canceled by the normalizing constant. That is, inconsistent comparisons only affect the model and the estimation if it is possible for them to be consistent is in the sample space.
For convenience, further let y obs.
i,j be the observed rank of j among those with whom i had interacted, with 33 being code for the highest frequency, 1 being code for the lowest frequency, and ranks for tied alters (i.e., y ct.
i,k , for k = j) being computed by averaging the "positions" that these alters share. Coefficients statistically significant at α = 0.05 are bolded. Standard errors incorporate the uncertainty introduced by approximating of the likelihood using MCMC (Hunter and Handcock, 2006) .
Effect of frequency of interaction
The first question we address is whether the magnitude of the difference in the frequency of interaction affects the accuracy. That is, if i's frequency of interaction with j differs from i's frequency of interactions with k by more than i's frequency of interaction with j differs from i's frequency of interaction with l, is i more likely to rank j and k accurately than j and l?
To answer this, we begin by fitting a simple model with two covariates: x i,j,k,1 = 1 in the form (13), equivalent to plain inconsistency (11); and x i,j,k,2 = y ct.
i,j − y ct.
i,k , the absolute difference between the interaction frequency of i with j and k. We report the results in Table 3 . Greater difference in interaction frequency of two alters does appear to lead to greater accuracy (i.e., lower inaccuracy) in reporting their relative ranks.
We also fit a similar model where we replace frequency difference with frequency rank difference: x i,j,k,2 = y obs.
i,j − y obs.
i,k . We find that the effect of rank difference is, as expected, negative, but not statistically significantly so. This lack of significance may be counterintuitive, but it is, in fact, a consequence of the constraints imposed by the sample space. Intuitively, given that i ranks j and k adjacently, an inaccurate reporting of the pairwise comparison of these alters (e.g., y ct.
i: j>k but y i: k>j ) does not entail misreporting any other pairwise comparisons, including those involving j or k; but if j and k are some d > 1 ranks apart in y ct.
-they have d − 1 other alters between them-then inaccurately reporting of the pairwise comparison of j and k entails inaccurately reporting the pairwise comparisons y ct.
i: j>l and/or y ct.
i: k>l for every l ranked between j and k. It can be shown easily that any configuration y in which y i: k>j = y ct.
i: j>k must also misreport at least d − 1 such comparisons. Thus, even a model with no rank difference effect and only a baseline inconsistency effect would already heavily penalize inaccurate reporting of comparisons between distantly-ranked alters.
Effect of salience
The second question that we address is whether the accuracy of reported ranking is affected by the positions of those being ranked. Can an ego i better discern the ranking of those with whom he or she interacts the most? Is he or she more accurate at the extremes?
To answer this, we fit a model for inconsistency that is a quadratic polynomial in rank values. More concretely, in the form (13), w i,j,k (θ) has the covariate vector
inducing a model in which the inconsistency of reported with observed is modeled as a second-degree polynomial function of the observed ranks of the alters being compared; and this function is symmetric for these two alters. The statistics in (14) represent baseline inconsistency, linear effect of ranks of the alters being compared, their quadratic effect, and their interaction effect, respectively. In fitting this model, we found that it suffers from collinearity, which impedes inference, so to improve its numeric conditioning, we fit an equivalent model, using rescaled and centered quantiles, evaluating y q.
i,j = (y obs.
i,j −17)/32 and substituting y q. for y obs. in (14). We report results from this fit in Table 4 . All four covariates appear to be highly significant. Somewhat surprisingly, the higher-ranked alters appear to have slightly higher inconsistency between observed and reported. However, the negative coefficient on the quadratic term suggests that the middle ranks are reported with the least accuracy of all. We show the predicted inconsistency weight w i,j,k (θ) as a function of their observed ranks in Figure 3 . From this, it appears that, indeed, for alters whose observed rankings are close together, the accuracy is lowest if the alters are ranked in the middle. (For alters whose observed rankings are far apart, the accuracy is higher.)
Conclusion
Rank-order data are a cornerstone of psychological and sociometric measurement, but principled treatment of such data in an interpersonal context Coefficients statistically significant at α = 0.05 are bolded. Standard errors incorporate the uncertainty introduced by approximating of the likelihood using MCMC (Hunter and Handcock, 2006) . Here, we have shown how statistical exponential families may be used to generalize the now well-known ERGM framework to the rank-order case. We have also introduced a corresponding set of sufficient statistics that are appropriate for use when only within-ego ordinal judgments are psychologically meaningful, a restriction that is important when modeling such data. As with conventional ERGMs, a wide range of statistics may be posited to capture alternative psychological and social mechanisms; the ability to evaluate and compare competing models based on such distinct alternatives is one of the strengths of the statistical approach.
It should be noted that, in our development, we focus on the case of orderings that are defined from the psychological process in question, rather than data that are ordinal simply due to limitations in measurement (e.g., count or continuous data observed only as ranks). Although the present framework may in some cases be useful for such data (e.g., to avoid having to model the count distribution), the assumptions involved, e.g., in the choice of sufficient statistics (and their interpretation), may be quite different.
This work has focused on complete orderings, but the above distinction gains further importance when considering partial orderings: the case of partial orderings being a property of underlying psychological phenomena is substantively different from the case of incomplete orderings arising from measurement itself. A well-known example of the latter is a frequently used sociometric survey design that asks each ego to rank their top k alters with respect to some criterion (liking, interaction frequency, etc.). For instance, Sampson (1968) famously asked each of 18 novitiates in a monastery to rank their three most liked novitiates among the other 17. That only the top three were ranked does not mean that the underlying ordering is partial and that the remaining 14 alters are tied. Rather, their ranking relative to each other is unobserved by design. Similarly, in 1995 Similarly, in -1996 , Wave I of National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health asked high school students to list, in order, up to 5 male and up to 5 female friends (Harris et al., 2003) . Again, the students unranked (either because they fell below the respondent's threshold for friendship or because the respondent ran out of space on the form) are not all substantively tied (i.e., assigned the same rank) but are merely unobserved. Cases of unobserved ranking are better handled by means of a latent variable framework in which a probability distribution is placed on the complete data, and in which likelihood is assessed via the marginalization of the complete data conditional on that observed. Such a strategy has been used in the traditional ERGM framework by Handcock and Gile (2010) , and can be employed here as well.
In contrast, orderings in which the alters may be substantively tied or incomparable with each other-partial orderings-pose greater challenges. In the complete ordering case, there exists a distribution of rank-orderings that is unambiguously uniform and can thus serve as the baseline distribution (reference measure) for the exponential family (Barndorff-Nielsen, 1978, pp. 115-116, for example) . In the partially ordered case, there is no natural baseline that is unambiguously uniform. For example, an ego may rank all n − 1 alters equally (with only one such "ranking" possible) or he or she may assign a distinct rank to each (with (n − 1)! possible rankings), or anything in between. A baseline distribution could, among myriad possibilities, assign the same weight to each of the (n − 1)! complete orderings as it does to the single all-tied partial ordering, or it could assign the same total weight to the class of all complete ordering as to the (singleton) class of all-tied orderings. Each such baseline is potentially useful in certain situations, and must be chosen on substantive grounds. Statistics selected for modeling partial orders must further represent not just actors' ranking propensities (relative to the chosen baseline) but also their choices not to rank.
Thus, in this paper, we focused our discussion on complete orderings. Despite our focus on complete orderings, our techniques can (with appropriate choice of reference measure) be generalized to the weaker case, however: all of the model statistics that we present in Section 3 can be applied to partially ordered network data without modification, because they only make references to the network of interest through the indicator y ·: ·>· (2).
Finally, we note that development of ERGMs for rank order data opens the way to a rich family of novel statistical models for phenomena such as interdependent choice behavior in group context, social influence on preferences, etc. Particularly because of their suitability for data collected in observational settings, rank order ERGMs provide a useful tool for considering both new and classic problems in social psychology and the study of decision making.
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